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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Background 
 
Patient safety has become a significant and pressing policy issue. Around the world, 
governments, the health care sector and the public are increasingly cognizant of the need to 
improve the safety of care delivered by their health systems. Pressure for change has been 
created by highly publicized incidents in a number of countries involving unsafe acts that 
were significant both in scale and consequence and a number of empirical studies that 
revealed the high rates of unsafe acts and their consequences.  The costs of unsafe health care 
– both personal and fiscal – to individuals, their families and their communities and to the 
state are massive.   
 
In this research project we explored one particular avenue for change – that is, the use of legal 
instruments by governments to improve patient safety.  We did this through a comparative 
review of the use of legal instruments or frameworks in other countries (specifically Australia, 
Denmark, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States) as well as two non-
health care related sectors in Canada (transportation and occupational health and safety).   
 
We began this research by reviewing the legal instruments and undertaking extensive 
literature reviews.  Further information was gathered through in-person interviews with 
policy-makers and academics in the countries studied, and from policy-makers and academics 
expert in the health, occupational health and safety, and transportation sectors in Canada. 
Once descriptions of the various countries and sectors were drafted, we held small-group 
meetings with local experts on particular aspects of patient safety.  We then hosted a national 
consultation meeting.  We subsequently drafted this final report and the appendices, which 
fully describe the results of the background research.  Finally, we prepared a summary version 
of the report as well as posters and papers to be published and delivered at conferences and 
meetings with relevant groups. 
 
Key Contributions 
 
1. Identification of general themes or trends in other countries (but not yet strongly in 
Canada) 
 
• a growing unwillingness of governments to leave patient safety to their health care 
systems or to the institutions and providers who make up the health care system.  The 
tendency is to turn, instead, to law.   
• a shift to what is sometimes called meta-regulation.  Much of the law that has recently 
been introduced in other countries creates legal frameworks of oversight, 
accountability, and/or supervision that either displace or supplement the legal 
frameworks that have traditionally conferred a significant degree of autonomy on 
providers, institutions, and community-level governing bodies.  
• a shift from a preoccupation with regulating the specific source or setting of care to 
regulating through a broader system perspective. 
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• a heavy reliance on information and transparency as key enablers and drivers of 
patient safety. 
 
2. Identification of a new area of law, i.e., patient safety law 
 
Having taken a system governance perspective, we identified a body of law that can be 
described as patient safety law, in that it functions to protect the patient by reducing unsafe 
acts within the health care system. The different areas of law that affect patient safety (e.g., 
tort law, professional regulation, institutional regulation) are not usually conceived of as an 
integrated system of law.  However, conceiving of patient safety law as an integrated entity 
has value since it allows the discussion to move away from thinking in terms of narrow siloed 
categories of law to thinking of the larger systemic objectives the legal framework should 
enable regarding the governance of patient safety. 
 
3. Development of a patient safety law matrix 
 
We developed a matrix as an analytical tool that brings together the areas of law that make up 
patient safety law.  The matrix makes it apparent that these different areas of law are 
interrelated and interact in ways that can usefully be viewed through the lens of patient safety.  
The matrix is a tool for analyzing the state of patient safety law in a jurisdiction. Used as part 
of a process, the matrix is descriptive, diagnostic, and prescriptive in nature. It provides a 
structure for mapping out existing patient safety law, identifying gaps or deficiencies in the 
legal framework, and identifying the outcomes patient safety law should promote.  In 
significant measure it does this by highlighting the actual and potential interaction between 
the different types of law that affect patient safety but that are commonly overlooked due to 
the traditional organization of legal analysis around bodies of law, rather than around the 
problems or issues to which the distinct bodies of law apply. 
 
Key Recommendations  
 
1. Address identified gaps and weaknesses 
 
By applying the matrix to the current Canadian legal framework, we were able to identify 
significant gaps and weaknesses.  For example, we unveiled the fact that there are sites of care 
delivery that are underregulated, that some health care professionals are unregulated, and that 
drugs and devices are underregulated.  We also identified underreporting of adverse events as 
well as numerous barriers to sharing information across inquiry processes.  We identified the 
need for a systemic response to be taken to unsafe acts.  This approach should both drives 
improvements in the system and yet maintain individual accountability where appropriate. 
 
2. Conduct further study 
 
Further study is needed on the difference between Canada’s approach to patient safety law 
and the approaches observable in other countries, in part because the difference is so 
significant.  This further study should not be organized around and through an analytical 
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framework that only compares particular aspects or bodies of Canadian law to their 
counterparts in other countries; it should take a holistic approach.   
 
More specifically, further research should be conducted into initiatives taken in other 
countries that might be transferable to Canada, including: 
 
• adoption of national standards and certification for health care institutions and across 
health care settings (e.g., New Zealand national standards and certification) 
 
• umbrella oversight of health care professionals (e.g., New Zealand Health and 
Disability Commissioner) 
 
• oversight of clinical trial design quality (e.g., Danish Medicines Agency) 
 
• mandatory adverse event reporting by health care providers (e.g., Danish system) 
 
• harmonization of fatality inquiry legislation (e.g., Australia) 
 
• accountability frameworks that apply across the spectrum of providers, institutions, 
and of actors who collectively are responsible for the delivery of safe care to 
individual patients (e.g., New Zealand legislation) 
 
3. Apply the patient safety law matrix 
 
On an ongoing basis, the patient safety law matrix should be used to reflect the current state 
of Canadian patient safety law, identify gaps and deficiencies, and identify the outcomes that 
patient safety law should promote. 
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I. OVERVIEW 
 
A. Context 
 
Patient safety has become a significant and pressing policy issue. Around the world, 
governments, the health care sector and the public are increasingly cognizant of the need to 
improve the safety of care delivered by their health systems. Pressure for change has been 
created by highly publicized incidents in a number of countries involving unsafe acts that 
were significant both in scale and consequence1 and a number of empirical studies that 
revealed the high rates of unsafe acts and their consequences.2  The costs of unsafe health 
care – both personal and fiscal – to individuals, their families and their communities and to 
the state are massive. 
 
Some of the pressure for change has been directed at issues relating to the governance of 
patient safety.  This is in part because the trust accorded to health professionals and 
institutions in the past has eroded somewhat.  This erosion is in turn due in part to perceived 
failures to self-regulate effectively, in part to a sense that professionalism has been and is 
eroding, particularly in medicine, and in part to the rise of the consumer movement.3   
 
An additional reason for the focus on governance and patient safety is the fact that the nature 
of the state’s role in governance is changing – many states are becoming so-called ‘regulatory 
states,’ which use a different kind of regulation and create different kinds of relationships 
between policy actors, including regulatory bodies.  States are enacting new governance 
frameworks to regulate bodies in sectors that have been previously privatized or are 
traditionally self-regulating. In many of these frameworks, information is increasingly 
gathered and used to highlight the performance of sectors and to drive improvements. In many 
international jurisdictions, as in some sectors in Canada, the focus of regulation is moving 
towards adding another level of regulatory or quasi-regulatory activity – meta-regulation – to 
regulate the regulators or to govern multiple regulatory structures. Meta-regulation in its most 
common form involves an external regulator monitoring the activities of self-regulators to 
ensure self-regulation is externally acceptable and accountable.4  
                                                 
1 See Appendix 1.  
2 T.A. Brennan et al., “Incidence of Adverse Events and Negligence in Hospitalized Patients. Results of the 
Harvard Medical Practice Study I” (1991) 324 N. Engl. J. Med. 370; R. Wilson et al., “Quality in Australian 
Health Care Study (1996) 164 Med. J. Aust. 754; C. Vincent, G. Neale & M. Woloshynowych, “Adverse Events 
in British Hospitals: Preliminary Retrospective Record Review” (2001) 322 B.M.J. 517, erratum in: (2001) 322 
B.M.J. 1395; T. Schioler et al., Danish Adverse Event Study “[Incidence of Adverse Events in Hospitals. A 
Retrospective Study of Medical Records]” (2001) 163 Ugeskr Laeger 5370; P. Davis et al., “Adverse Events in 
New Zealand Public Hospitals I: Occurrence and Impact” (2002) 115 N.Z. Med. J. U271; G. Baker et al., “The 
Canadian Adverse Events Study: The Incidence of Adverse Events Among Hospital Patients in Canada” (2004) 
170 C.M.A.J. 1678.   
3 See for example discussion in Michelle Mello, Carly Kelly & Troyen Brennan, “Fostering Rational Regulation 
of Patient Safety” (2005) 30 J. Health Pol. 375. 
4  John Braithwaite, Judith Healey & Kathryn Dwan, The Governance of Health Safety and Quality (Australia:  
Commonwealth of Australia, 2005) at 25-26, 58 [Braithwaite]. The paper identifies two regulated self-regulation 
strategies: enforced quality improvement and enforced self-regulation. The first stimulates a sector to improve 
performance by requiring self-regulators to choose an area of concern and develop continuous improvement 
strategies, whose impact is then measured. The second strategy, enforced self-regulation, gives self-regulators 
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This research project focuses on governance structures for patient safety in health systems.  
There is a complex array of public and private actors at the local, regional, national and 
international level that shape policy and practice in the health sector.  These actors all play 
important roles and use a variety of tools to address patient safety issues.  However, this 
research further focuses in on the role of only one actor, i.e., government, and primarily on the 
use of one instrument, i.e., law.   
 
A function of government is to establish an “interlocking network of public powers that 
regulate and guide action in a relatively consistent way, providing minimum standards of 
conduct and relief from harm.”5  Government has somewhat asymmetrical relationships with 
other actors that shape policy and practice due to governmental monopolies over the process 
of establishing legislation.6  Legal instruments are therefore one tool which government 
(unlike other actors) may use to achieve policy ends.  Ideally, all parties involved collaborate 
to achieve the desired outcomes, choosing from a multiplicity of legal and non-legal solutions. 
Some possible solutions are the legitimate concern of law; in other contexts, law should only 
be used after other non-legal mechanisms have been unsuccessful.  Scrutiny of why and how 
government uses its monopoly power over the creation of, or scope and coverage of, legal 
instruments with respect to patient safety is therefore important.  It is important to note that 
governments’ use of legal instruments is only a part of a broader government responsibility 
for governance of the health care system.  However, it is this use of legal instruments that is 
the narrow subject of this report.  
 
Governance choices about whether to use a legal tool and what tool to use are often 
constrained or influenced by the nature of the existing relationships between policy actors, as 
well as by constitutional structures. Health systems are shaped by the interdependent 
relationships between governments, government agencies, health care institutions, health 
professionals, professional and institutional associations, interest groups, insurers, and the 
public.    The Canadian health system has been described as a system predominantly weighted 
toward medical professional and collegial mechanisms, a model which may favour 
governance choices that are collaborative (and accommodationist) in nature and thus utilize 
contracts, agreements and partnerships.7 In Canada, as in other federalist states, governmental 
decisions in relation to the use of legal instruments occur at federal and provincial levels 
which often interact with each other in complex ways.8  This has been noted as a significant 
challenge to the aims of consistency and continuity of outcomes.   
 
                                                                                                                                                        
the freedom to create their own standards, which are then approved and monitored by an external regulator to 
ensure an externally acceptable minimum standard of performance is being met (ibid. at 27-28).  
5 P. Hirst & G. Thompson, “Globalization and the Future of the Nation State” (1995) 24 Economy & Society 
408. 
6 R. Rhodes, Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and Accountability, 
(Buckingham: Open University Press, 1997).    
7 Carolyn Hughes Tuohy, Accidental Logics: The Dynamics of Change in the Health Care Arena in the United 
States, Britain and Canada (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
8 T. Jost, “Health Care Rationing in the Courts: A Comparative Study” (1997-1998) 21 Hastings Int’l & Comp. 
L. Rev. 639 at 640-644. 
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Historically, the relationship between government and providers of health services has been 
characterized by government’s reliance on self-regulation, with government relying on the 
expertise, experience, and professionalism of health professionals and the institutions and 
organizations that provide health services to ensure that those services are provided safely and 
are of an appropriate quality.  This has been supplemented by a consumerist approach of 
bottom-up enforcement by individual patients using tort law and or complaint processes to 
obtain compensation or other forms of redress and to deter future episodes of unsafe 
treatment.  In this project, we examine these traditional legal means of governing patient 
safety as well as emerging legal instruments and reforms to traditional instruments.    
 
Finally, in setting out the context for this report, we note that patient safety has traditionally 
taken a person-centered approach.  Such an approach focuses on apportioning responsibility 
to the individuals who are seen to have caused the unsafe act.9  Legal instruments used to 
address person-centered safety issues are aimed at individuals and generally fall within the 
compliance or control mode of regulation.10  Person-centered legal instruments create clear 
frameworks for individual accountability, which is important as individuals should most often 
be held accountable for their actions or omissions.  However, critics argue that a person-
centered approach isolates unsafe acts from their context and does not always recognize the 
complexities of system failures.  In addition, a focus on “naming, blaming and shaming” an 
individual is said to inhibit open discussions about episodes of unsafe care, resulting in an 
inability to learn from these episodes to facilitate the future provision of safe care.11   
 
A systems-centered approach to patient safety is increasingly influential in policymaking in 
the health care sector.12  The premise is that all humans are fallible, that systems should be 
developed to minimize opportunities for unsafe treatment, and that blame should be avoided 
in order to facilitate learning.  Under the systems-centered approach, when an unsafe act 
occurs, the important issues are how and why the defences failed and what factors helped 
create the conditions in which the unsafe acts occurred. On the other hand, critics suggest that 
the systems-centered approach may limit or obscure legitimate individual or organizational 
accountabilities.     
 
As both person-centered and systems-centered approaches are currently being used, the 
challenge of policy-making in this area appears to be to encourage the development of 
initiatives that will have a real and sustained impact upon the general level of patient safety, 
but at the same time to balance this with mechanisms that allow individuals and organizations 
to be held accountable when appropriate.   
                                                 
9 See discussion in Institute of Medicine, To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System (Washington: 
National Academy Press, 2000) [Institute of Medicine]. 
10 Christopher Newdick, “N.H.S. Governance after Bristol: Holding on, or Letting Go?” (2002) 10 Med. L. Rev. 
111 at 117. 
11 See for example, U.K., The Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry, The Report of the Public Inquiry into Children’s 
Heart Surgery at the Bristol Royal Infirmary 1984-1995: Learning from Bristol (Norwich: The Stationary Office 
Limited, 2001); J. Bryan Sexton, Eric J Thomas & Robert L Helmreich, “Error, Stress, and Teamwork in 
Medicine and Aviation: Cross Sectional Surveys” (2000) 320 B.M.J. 745; Institute of Medicine, supra note 9. 
12 See discussion in Institute of Medicine, ibid. 
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B. Terminology 
 
Please refer to the glossary at the end of this report for a discussion of key terms. 
 
C. Objectives   
 
A number of countries have undertaken patient safety-related law reforms. In this project, we 
sought to gain a comprehensive understanding of the legal instruments or frameworks being 
used in other countries to encourage safety in health care systems.    We also sought to learn 
from the experiences of two non-health care related Canadian sectors and the legal 
frameworks they use to govern safety. Where evidence was available, our aim was to 
critically assess these legal frameworks and to explore whether there are reform possibilities 
for the Canadian legal framework surrounding patient safety to be drawn from the experiences 
of other countries and sectors.  
 
D. Scope  
 
In this project, we were concerned with how governments use law and legal instruments as 
tools for governing patient safety. In addition to Canada, we focused on the use of legal 
instruments in Australia, Denmark, New Zealand, the United Kingdom (the National Health 
Service in England/Wales) and the United States.  These countries were selected because all 
had studies examining the incidence of unsafe acts in hospitals, and, in all, patient safety was 
identified as a policy priority within the management of health systems.   
 
We also focused on how governments in Canada use law as an instrument to address safety 
issues in the transportation and occupational health and safety sectors.  These sectors were 
selected because they place significant emphasis on the regulation of safety and have a long 
history of government involvement in regulation to ensure safety. 
 
E. Methodology 
 
We began this research by reviewing the legal instruments in place in each of the target 
countries and sectors.  We also undertook extensive literature reviews, including an 
examination of grey literature such as policy documents.  Further information was gathered 
through in-person interviews with policy-makers and academics in the countries studied, and 
from Canadian academics and policy-makers in the health, occupational health and safety, 
and transportation sectors in Canada. Once descriptions of the various countries and sectors 
were drafted, we held small-group meetings with local (Nova Scotia) experts on particular 
aspects of patient safety (e.g., professional regulation).  We then held a national consultation 
meeting, bringing together experts from across Canada to ensure that our synthesis research 
was complete and accurate and to reflect on the lessons to be learned from this research.  We 
then drafted this final report and the appendices in light of all of the research as well as the 
input from the external experts and the final reflections of the research team.  Finally, to serve 
the goals of dissemination and knowledge translation, we prepared a summary version of the 
report as well as posters and papers to be published and delivered at conferences and meetings 
with relevant groups (e.g., provincial health care safety advisory committees).   
 4
  
   
It is important to stress that this research is comparative.  We recognize that there are 
significant differences between Canada and the other countries studied.  Each country has a 
unique model for managing the conglomeration of health services, professions, and 
organizations that constitute its health systems.  Each health system is embedded in a broader 
system that manages social services and in turn is embedded in unique structures of 
government and a unique legal system.  It follows that an initiative that is appropriate and 
works effectively in one country and system may not work so well in another.  Transferability 
of law reform cannot be taken for granted.  That said, comparison is nonetheless instructive as 
there are substantial similarities between the countries studied.  Indeed, even reflecting on the 
experiences of other countries even in light of their differences from Canada can be 
illuminating. 
 
Canada is a federal state with a particular cultural, constitutional, and political context.  This 
makes Canadian health systems and the dynamics surrounding the use of legal instruments to 
create patient safety frameworks significantly different in many respects from the other 
countries studied in this report. Perhaps most similar are the U.S. and Australian contexts. 
These are somewhat constitutionally similar in that they too are federal models.  It is, 
however, important to note that Australia has a relatively homogeneous population and lacks 
the regional tensions that occur in the Canadian system.  The U.S. constitutional structure is 
also very different from the Canada.  Although we can learn valuable lessons from the 
experiences of Denmark, England, and New Zealand, the unitary systems in these countries 
make them potential models for systems change primarily for individual provinces or for the 
federal government including in its role as regulator of drugs and devices.  At the same time, 
the experience of countries with unitary systems may mean that they are not good models for 
a nationally driven patient safety governance framework. 
 
It is also important to emphasize that this is largely synthesis research.  We did not, for 
example, engage in any primary research on the effectiveness of particular reform initiatives 
in various countries.  All assessments of the safety initiatives in the different countries and 
sectors are based on reports in the literature and anecdotal evidence gathered through 
interviews.  The goal was to gather as much information as is available, to synthesize it, and 
where appropriate to use the results of the synthesis to point governments in the direction of 
further research and analysis aimed at specific law reform initiatives in the context of 
Canadian patient safety. 
 
Where this report is normative, we have used the following criteria: effectiveness, 
accountability, transparency, equity and efficiency.   We would argue that these criteria reflect 
principles of good governance and also of effective, or smart, regulation.13  However, it is 
important to note that many patient safety legal initiatives described in this project are 
relatively new; those that are not so new, such as professional regulation, have often recently 
been substantially reformed.  Given the nascent nature of some of these initiatives, there is 
often very little empirical data as to effectiveness or efficiency, although there may be much 
                                                 
13 N. Gunningham & P. Grabosky, Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy (Oxford: Claredon Press, 
1998); Lester Salamon, ed., The Tools of Government: A Guide to the New Governance (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002). 
 5
  
anecdotal evidence.  Even in the other non-health related sectors that were reviewed, there has 
often been little examination of macro level effectiveness or efficiency of the legal 
instruments used. 
 
F. Other Materials Produced 
 
In addition to this report, which discusses the key findings of our research, there are a number 
of appendices.  Appendix One provides a detailed discussion of the key concepts of patient 
safety and governance.  Appendix Two contains a series of country reports that describe the 
legal frameworks surrounding patient safety in the countries we studied, starting with Canada. 
The discussion in each country report is structured around the following uses of legal 
instruments: 
 
• The regulation of health institutions 
• The regulation of health professionals 
• The regulation of health related products (drugs and devices) 
• Inquiry processes 
• Compensation systems 
• Complaints mechanisms 
• Adverse event reporting systems 
• Other legislative instruments 
 
Where evidence is available, legal frameworks in these countries are assessed in each country 
report using the criteria set out above. Appendix Three consists of reports that describe safety 
related legal frameworks in two Canadian non-health related sectors, transportation and 
occupational health and safety. A list of key Canadian and international informants who 
shared information with us through interviews or consultation meetings is presented in 
Appendix Four.  Appendix Five summarizes both past and future dissemination activities. 
 
II. RESULTS 
 
A. General Themes 
 
This study revealed a diversity and richness of approaches to the role of health system 
governance in addressing patient safety that defies easy summary or generalization.  Subject 
to the obvious limitations imposed by our methodology and the scope of our study, we have 
done our best to capture at least the principal aspects of this diversity and richness in the 
appendices. 
 
At the same time, however, certain general patterns have emerged with sufficient clarity and 
consistency as to suggest that the approach being taken in diverse countries strongly reflects 
certain common themes or trends.  Perhaps the most obvious is simply that law is increasingly 
being used as an instrument for improving system-wide performance on patient safety.  To put 
it differently, one of the themes that we have identified is growing unwillingness of 
governments to leave patient safety to their health care systems or to the institutions and 
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providers who make up the health care system.  Not always, but frequently, these greater 
levels of governmental intervention take the form of new law that modifies the autonomy that 
has, in each of the jurisdictions studied, been entrusted to varying degrees to health care 
institutions and providers.  If nothing else, this new law illustrates the extent to which patient 
safety has become a matter of general public policy that must be pursued at the national or 
sub-national level.  It seems also to strongly indicate a declining level of trust and confidence 
in providers and in self-governance within the health care system, though this seems to be 
much more strongly the case in New Zealand or the United Kingdom (for example), than it is 
in the United States. 
 
This leads to a second theme of general scope – that much of what we have seen in the 
countries studied is consistent with a shift to what is sometimes called meta-regulation.  Much 
of the law that has recently been introduced in these countries creates legal frameworks of 
oversight, accountability, and/or supervision that either displace or supplement the legal 
frameworks that have traditionally confirmed a significant degree of autonomy on providers, 
institutions, and community-level governing bodies.  Again, the impetus for this “regulation 
of the regulators” seems clearly to be a decline in trust and confidence in providers and health 
system governors and managers.  But it also appears to be a response to the recognized need 
for broader frameworks of accountability and oversight that cut across the boundaries of 
legally defined autonomy that have traditionally separated providers into distinct self-
governing professionals and the system into distinct vertically defined sectors such as 
primary, acute, and chronic care. 
 
This shift from a preoccupation with the specific source or setting of care to a broader system 
perspective is the third theme we have seen across the countries we have studied.  Part of this 
is simply a repetition of what was said above – much of the activity that we have seen taking 
place in these countries consists of the creation of law and (using law) institutions that are 
more system-wide than those they have either replaced, supplemented, or modified.  But 
equally important is the uneven but nevertheless pronounced movement towards greater 
emphasis on prevention and avoidance either in place of or alongside of the traditional 
reliance on blaming and compensating.  In significant degree, we have seen law being 
increasingly used to encourage, often through the creation and mandating of new advisory or 
oversight bodies, the development of a culture of safety.  It is here that we have observed the 
greatest overlap between the use of law as an instrument of patient safety in the countries we 
have studied with the role that law has played in advancing safety in workplaces and in 
transportation in Canada. 
 
The fourth and final theme that we think worthy of mention here is the heavy reliance of the 
initiatives underway across the countries studied on information and transparency as key 
enablers and drivers of patient safety.  In each of the countries, providers and institutions and 
systems of care are being required to track and disclose information on their performance in 
keeping patients safe.  These obligations extend not only to events that cause injury but also to 
events that could have caused injury.  As such, reliance on professional codes of practice as 
well as on the fear of possible liability or reprimand are being supplemented by increasingly 
detailed accountability not only to external regulatory oversight  but also to the glare of 
publicity, with its implications either for reputational integrity or to market share or to both. 
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In our view, these themes capture something of the essence of what is happening outside 
Canada on governance and patient safety, at least to the extent that the countries we studied 
are representational.  With the possible exception of Quebec and the example of some 
relatively isolated initiatives in other provinces, we are struck by the extent to which these 
themes do not appear to have made their presence felt in Canada.  Here the legal framework 
around patient safety has been, in contrast to the situation in these other countries, remarkably 
stable.  For the most part, this means a continuing reliance on a decentralized system of 
multiple self-regulators, a high degree of relative autonomy of providers from the state, and 
the continuing dominance of blame and shame as the foundation of the law.  In our view, the 
very extent of the apparently growing divergence between Canada and such a varied group of 
comparator countries suggests the need for more detailed and thorough research into what is 
happening outside Canada with a view not only to assessing its transportability to Canada but 
also with a view to understanding the causes and implications of Canada’s relative comfort 
with the legal status quo on patient safety. 
 
B. Patient Safety Law Matrix 
 
In significant measure, our principal recommendation is the one given above: further study is 
needed on the difference between Canada’s approach to law and patient safety and the 
approaches observable in other countries, in part because the difference seems so significant.  
Beyond that, however, our more detailed recommendation is that this further study should not 
be organized around and through an analytical framework that only compares particular 
aspects or bodies of Canadian law to their counterparts in other countries.  While these micro 
level studies undoubtedly have their importance, they are likely to be more interesting to 
lawyers who are interested in comparative questions of legal doctrine or technique than they 
are to policy-makers who are interested in understanding legal tools as instruments of system 
governance.  From that perspective, an analytical framework that embraces the full range of 
instruments that are available either as alternatives to one another or as complementary 
instruments of governance, is critically important. 
 
In our view, especially from a system governance perspective, there is a body of law that can 
be described as patient safety law, in that it functions to protect the patient by reducing unsafe 
acts within the health care system. The different areas of law that affect patient safety (e.g., 
tort law, professional regulation, institutional regulation) are not usually conceived of as an 
integrated system of law.  However, conceiving of patient safety law as integrated has value 
in that it allows the discussion to move away from thinking in terms of narrow siloed 
categories of law to thinking of the larger systemic objectives the legal framework should 
enable in regard to the governance of patient safety. The matrix we have developed (see 
below) is an analytical tool that brings together these areas of law in a framework. Once 
highlighted in this fashion, it becomes apparent that these different areas of law are 
interrelated and interact in ways that can usefully be viewed through the lens of patient safety.  
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The matrix is a tool for analyzing the state of patient safety law in a jurisdiction. Used as part 
of a process, the matrix is descriptive, diagnostic, and prescriptive in nature. It provides a 
structure for mapping out existing patient safety law, identifying gaps or deficiencies in the 
legal framework, and identifying the outcomes patient safety law should promote.  In 
significant measure it does this by highlighting the actual and potential interaction between 
the different types of law that affect patient safety but that are commonly overlooked due to 
the traditional organization of legal analysis around bodies of law, rather than around the 
problems or issues to which the distinct bodies of law apply. 
 
Obviously, a health care system’s ability to prevent, identify, analyze, and respond to unsafe 
acts is influenced by the legal frameworks in place. Patient safety law functions within each 
of the three parts of the matrix: preventing, knowing about, and responding. Legal 
frameworks or instruments interact and may affect each other, either positively or negatively, 
both within and across the three parts. A particular legal instrument or framework, such as tort 
law, may figure in all three parts.  
 
In the first part, legal instruments are used to help prevent and/or minimize the risk of unsafe 
acts in the health system.  Some areas of law have traditionally tried to do this by deterring 
unsafe behaviour by assigning responsibility for such behaviour after it has caused injury or 
been the subject of a complaint.  Examples are tort law and the disciplinary processes 
established by the laws governing self-regulating professions.  Proactive legal frameworks 
recognize the risks in the system and establish processes, tools or responsibilities that try to 
create a preventative culture of safety.  Examples include laws that establish accountability 
frameworks for patient safety, standards for health care delivery, continuing competency 
requirements for health care practitioners, and licensing processes for drugs and devices.  
Patient safety law seeks to prevent or minimize unsafe acts by regulating where health care is 
delivered, who delivers health care, and what services, tools, and products can or must be 
used in the provision of care.   
 
A health care system’s ability to identify unsafe acts and to learn from them is an important 
aspect of patient safety.  In the second part of the matrix, legal instruments are used to create 
mechanisms or conditions that facilitate both the discovery and bringing forth of unsafe acts 
and the subsequent inquiry into or analysis of their causes. 
 
The final part of the matrix addresses responses to unsafe acts occurring in the health care 
system. The response of the system depends on the outcomes it wishes to achieve. In turn, the 
ability of the system to achieve a desired outcome is influenced by the legal frameworks in 
place. Responses can be directed at either an individual or a systemic level, or both. At the 
level of the individual provider (individual or institution/organization), the outcome may 
serve accountability and/or restorative (rehabilitative or facilitative) functions.  For the 
patient, the outcome may be restorative in nature (compensation/truth-telling/apology). On the 
systemic level, the desired outcome is system-wide learning and improvement that seeks to 
convert lessons learned into improved practices and processes across the system. By 
incorporating lessons learned, the system is ideally continuously improving its preventative 
and detective/investigative capacity at the first and second parts of the matrix. 
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When using the matrix, the first step is to map out the existing legal instruments and 
frameworks at play in each part. In this report, we have included a matrix that represents the 
current state of patient safety law in Canada in black (see below). In order to assess the 
weaknesses or gaps of a health system’s legal framework, evaluative criteria must be chosen. 
The criteria of effectiveness, efficiency, equity, transparency and accountability have been 
incorporated in this project where possible. Possible solutions need to be assessed using the 
criteria as well, with an eye to their direct and indirect effects on activities in other parts in 
order to avoid the ‘push-down pop-up’ phenomenon where addressing one issue creates 
another unexpected problem elsewhere in the system. 
 
C. Recommendations 
 
In addition to promoting the matrix as a tool for analyzing how legal frameworks and 
instruments affect patient safety in health systems, we recommend that certain key 
weaknesses and gaps in Canada’s legal framework surrounding patient safety be addressed. 
Having identified these gaps and weaknesses by applying the matrix, we then highlight 
possible solutions that might, with further research and analysis, be adopted (with appropriate 
modification) from the patient safety experience of other countries or from the Canadian 
experience with transportation or general occupational health and safety.  The discussion is 
framed around the matrix as a whole and its three parts: preventing, knowing about, and 
responding. 
 
1. The Importance of a Global View 
 
The matrix reflects an integrated system or framework for patient safety.  While in the 
following sections we analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the Canadian patient safety 
legal framework at the national and provincial/territorial levels in regard to the individual or 
distinct parts of the matrix, we also think it important that the overall picture not be lost sight 
of.  Many of the countries and other sectors that we have studied have in common an intention 
to move the analysis of safety related issues from a focus on individuals to a focus on 
systems, their failures, and what can be done by and through systems to improve safety: to 
prevent; to know; and to respond. In parallel to this shift is another shift from a focus on 
reform of specific fields of law (tort law, professional regulation, institutional regulation, etc.) 
to a general reform of all or at least multiple bodies of law that have in common their concern 
with patient safety.  In these two shifts, law is being used as an instrument to create safer 
systems of care. To that end, these countries and sectors recognize that preventing or 
minimizing the risk of unsafe acts in a health system calls for leadership and coordination 
from all involved in the delivery of health services. Legal frameworks that take a systems 
approach clarify the responsibilities and thus accountabilities between the many actors in the 
health system around patient safety and require safety focused systems to be put in place.  
They thereby establish patient safety as a priority, reduce uncertainty, and create a foundation 
for the development of patient safety regulatory initiatives and programs.  To do that, they 
need also to deal with and clarify or modify the interaction between distinct bodies of law, 
whether that is done to maximize cumulative impact through alignment or to minimize or 
eliminate the tendency of one to work at cross purposes with another.  
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The Australian approach is a valuable model with respect to a systems approach for Canada 
particularly since (as was discussed earlier) Australia has a somewhat similar constitutional 
framework. Early on Australia recognized that patient safety and healthcare quality is a 
national priority and must be addressed consistently across the provinces and territories and at 
the federal level.  Accordingly, they developed the Australian Conference to meet annually to 
try to achieve consistent approaches to health policy.  Patient safety and healthcare quality is 
always on the agenda at these conferences and is always publicly reported.  This provides 
leadership at the highest level for patient safety and quality initiatives.  Through the 
development of a consensus, the Conference prioritizes patient safety and quality initiatives 
and endeavors to achieve consistency, at least at the level of the development of principles to 
guide policy making between governments.  In addition, the Conference has created an 
Australian Health Ministers’ Advisory Council comprised of representatives of the Regional 
Health Authorities in each state and territory to provide advice on matters of health policy.  
Lastly, the Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care reports directly to 
the Ministers’ Conference and provides strategic advice.  Canada could learn from this 
approach, which prioritizes safety and quality at the national level and tries to achieve 
consistency in application. 
 
At the provincial level, few provinces have created clear system level accountability 
frameworks for patient safety and there have been few attempts to use law to put practices in 
place to change cultures and make patient safety a priority for all. In the other sectors studied, 
law is used to establish processes, tools and duties that attempt to create internal cultures of 
safety in the sector.  Canadian occupational health and safety (OHS) law sets out the 
responsibilities of governments and workplace parties as well as a framework for the internal 
governance of workplaces in respect of occupational health and safety. Employers, employees 
and other workplace parties have a general legal duty to take every reasonable precaution to 
ensure workplace safety, as well as a number of other specific responsibilities.  OHS law 
requires larger employers to establish joint health and safety committees, which act as a forum 
for encouraging cooperation between management and employees on occupational health and 
safety issues. Smaller employers are required to facilitate participation through alternative 
means, such as the appointment of an employee safety representative. Their legal functions 
may include investigating complaints, identifying hazards, auditing activities, and making 
safety recommendations.  As part of a system of regulated self-regulation, government 
conducts external inspections and other enforcement activities.   
 
In the Canadian railway and aviation sectors, rail and airline companies must have in place a 
safety management system (SMS).  These systems for managing risk include a number of 
internal processes, such as processes for safety goal setting, hazard identification, maintaining 
properly trained and competent staff, internal incident or accident reporting, employee 
awareness of responsibilities, and internal auditing of the system. Transport Canada maintains 
a system of formal audits to assess compliance with safety regulations and the effectiveness of 
SMSs. In the Canadian aviation sector, companies are also required to appoint an accountable 
executive who is responsible for corporate decisions affecting safety. There is evidence to 
suggest that SMSs can be both effective and cost-efficient.14 We therefore suggest that 
                                                 
14 SMSs have been successfully implemented in the chemical industry in the United Kingdom. SMS systems 
have been voluntarily used for a number of years by Air Transat, who reports fewer reactive and more proactive 
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transportation (particularly in the aviation sector) and occupational health and safety show 
promise in this respect and are worth further study as possible role models for system level 
frameworks for patient safety. 
 
New Zealand’s patient safety framework also shows promise in this regard in that it not only 
establishes the accountabilities of actors within the system for safety, but also requires that 
certain practices be in place within institutions/organizations to endeavour to embed safety as 
a cultural norm. The Minister of Health provides health sector direction and is required by law 
to develop a quality improvement strategy for the health sector.15 The Ministry of Health is 
responsible for monitoring the performance of District Health Boards (DHBs) and annual 
Crown Funding Agreements reached between the Ministry and the DHBs set out funding and 
performance expectations, including safety and quality expectations.  DHBs are responsible 
for monitoring the performance of providers contracted with. The responsibilities of providers 
for safe outcomes are expressed in the Code of Health and Disability Services Consumer 
Rights and through national standards which require the development in each organisation of 
quality and risk management processes, adverse event reporting systems, and complaints 
processes.16 Accountability to consumers is enhanced through the Health and Disability 
Commissioner, an independent complaints resolution body responsible for protecting and 
promoting the consumer rights in the Code as well as through a free national independent 
advocacy service that supports consumers in resolving concerns with providers.17 We 
recommend that Canadian governments work towards the adoption of accountability 
frameworks and effective safety standards that are process-based and reinforced by internal 
and external audit processes. The specific content of such frameworks requires further 
research. However, based on the research conducted for this report, it is clear that 
accountability frameworks that profile and prioritize patient safety governance should be 
given careful consideration. 
 
2. Part One – Preventing 
 
Areas of law relating to prevention include institutional regulation, products regulation, 
professional regulation and tort law.  As stated above, patient safety law that aims to prevent 
unsafe behaviour or injury from unsafe behaviour can generally be said to do so by 
                                                                                                                                                        
reports received and also savings of approximately $2 million per month.  From the experiences of Air Transat, 
Transport Canada argues that it appears that such systems can be effective and also cost-effective to implement 
(Transport Canada, “Safety Management Systems (SMS) – Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ),” online: 
Transport Canada <http://www.tc.gc.ca/civilaviation/SMS/FAQ/General/Q1.htm>; Michael Dilolo, “Safety 
Management Systems: A Way of Life,” online:  Transport Canada 
<http://www.tc.gc.ca/civilaviation/systemsafety/CASS/2004/PDF/Dilollo2.pdf>). 
15  New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act 2000 (N.Z.), 2000/91, s. 9.  Under the law, the strategy must 
involve the development of nationally consistent standards and quality assurance programmes for health services 
that address patient or consumer safety and nationally consistent performance monitoring. The Minister is 
required to consult with appropriate organizations before developing the strategy and must report publicly each 
year on the progress made in implementing the strategy. 
16 Health and Disability Sector Standards (N.Z.), S2001/8134 [Health Standards]; Health and Disability 
Commissioner (Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers’ Rights) Regulations 1996 (N.Z.), 1996/78, 
Sch. I. 
17 Both the Commissioner and the independent advocacy service were established under the Health and 
Disability Commissioner Act 1994 (N.Z.), 1994/88. 
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controlling or influencing one of three variables: where care is delivered, who delivers care, 
and what is delivered. 
 
a. Where 
 
Canada uses a traditional licensing model to regulate institutions such as hospitals and long-
term/residential facilities. The model focuses on inputs, such as the size of rooms, the number 
of bathrooms, etc., rather than outputs or the safety and quality of outcomes for patients. The 
model is a static rather than a dynamic one that equates safety with environmental conditions, 
ignoring the agency of human actions or the functioning of care delivery processes.  In other 
countries and sectors, a more rigorous systems approach that is focused on outcomes and 
continuous improvement is taken, coupled with enhanced monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms.   
 
Possible examples from other countries exist on a spectrum with respect to levels of 
government involvement in the setting of standards and/or the monitoring of compliance with 
standards.  Some jurisdictions make use of legal frameworks in which outcome-based 
standards are set by government based on input from the health sector and then compliance is 
independently audited (New Zealand, United Kingdom, Australia’s aged care sector).  Other 
jurisdictions make greater use of legal frameworks that require or recognize accreditation by a 
private accreditation body (United States, Victoria, Australia, and Quebec). We recommend 
further study of New Zealand’s legislative framework concerning standards and certification 
found in the Health and Disability Services (Safety) Act 2001.18  The Health and Disability 
Sector Standards19 developed under this framework are wide-ranging, outcome-driven and 
process-based.  Criteria on how to achieve these outcomes are provided in the standards, 
which are intended to foster continuous improvement.   Independent audit agencies assess 
providers for compliance with the standards.  The costs of implementing such a framework 
would need to be assessed in terms of the funds required to help institutions achieve the 
desired outcomes, as well as administration and enforcement costs, measured against the 
potential benefits, both fiscal and otherwise, of safer outcomes. Statutory authority for Health 
Ministers to develop health care delivery standards currently exists in a number of 
provinces.20 The exercise of political will is now needed. 
 
Improving the safety of care delivered by the Canadian health system involves recognizing 
that the settings in which health care is delivered are shifting beyond traditionally regulated 
institutions.  Home and community care, primary care and private care in Canada are 
unregulated or under-regulated in terms of patient safety.   In the jurisdictions examined, the 
general trend has been to expand the use of legal frameworks to regulate quality and safety 
across the legal boundaries that have usually defined and separated different places of care. 
For example, in the United Kingdom, core standards apply to NHS care providers across care 
settings, including primary care, and compliance is assessed by the Health Care Commission, 
                                                 
18 Health and Disability Services (Safety) Act 2001 (N.Z.), 2001/93.  
19 Health Standards, supra note 16. 
20 Health Authorities Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 180, s.3; Regional Health Authorities Act, C.C.S.M. c. R34, s. 3(2); 
Hospitals Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. H-12, s. 28(b); Hospital Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 200, s. 56(g); Hospitals Act, 
R.S.N.L. 1990, c. H-9, s. 37(a). 
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a statutory agency.  Similarly, the private health care sector is regulated under the Care 
Standards Act 2000, and providers in this sector seeking to operate certain facilities or offer 
specific services must register with the Health Care Commission. The Commission inspects 
private health care establishments to ensure compliance with sector specific regulations and 
national minimum standards.21 Legal frameworks for addressing the governance of patient 
safety in these settings should be the subject of future research and subsequent action in 
Canada.  
 
b. Who 
 
The types of professions and occupations that deliver health care are expanding.  New 
providers, such as home care workers and personal care workers, are largely untouched by 
state regulation.  Some jurisdictions, such as New Zealand and the State of Victoria, 
Australia, have developed patient complaint mechanisms that include these actors and 
therefore the complaints commissioner in these jurisdictions can investigate the quality of 
care they provide as well as complaints against those against the members of the traditionally 
regulated professions. The New Zealand Health and Disability Commissioner can also refer 
cases involving unregulated health professionals to New Zealand’s Human Rights Tribunal. 
The deterrence factor of complaints investigations may contribute to prevention. Ontario’s 
Health Professions Regulatory Advisory Council (HPRAC) is currently considering whether 
personal support workers should be regulated through traditional professional self-regulation 
under Ontario’s Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991.22  The appropriate role of law in 
ensuring the safe delivery of care by these occupations in order to protect the public from 
harm is a gap in knowledge that requires future study. 
 
Quality assurance and continuing competency programs for health professionals are proactive 
mechanisms aimed at maintaining the competency and safe practice of health professionals 
throughout their career.   There is a lack of literature and “little evidence of implementation 
and few evaluations” 23 of such programs in Canada. We are struck by the greater emphasis, 
backed by law, on ongoing competency and continuous improvement in most of the countries 
we studied.  Alberta and Ontario are progressive in this area.  Their legislation requires 
colleges to develop continuing competency or quality assurance programs and makes 
participation in these programs mandatory.  Under Alberta’s legislation, a health professional 
has to complete a continuing competence program in order to receive a practice permit, which 
is usually issued annually by colleges.  Alberta’s legislation also enables approved colleges to 
use practice visits or on-site assessment activities as a mechanism to ensure their continuing 
competence program requirements are being met. Member commitment and understanding is 
important for the successful implementation of these programs.  Care should be taken so that 
the objectives of mechanisms, in particular practice assessments or visits, are clear and reflect 
                                                 
21 Care Standards Act 2000 (U.K.), 2000, c. 14; Private and Voluntary Healthcare (England) Regulations 2001 
(U.K.), S.I. 2001/3968; Department of Health, Independent Health Care National Minimum Standards 
Regulations (London:  The Stationary Office, 2002). 
22 Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991, S.O. 1991, c.18, s. 11(1)(a) [Regulated Health Professions Act]; 
Health Professions Regulatory Advisory Council, online:  < http://www.hprac.org/english/new.asp>.  One of 
HPRAC’s statutory duties is to advise the minister on “whether unregulated professions should be regulated.”   
23 Health Professions Regulatory Advisory Council, Executive Summary (Sept 2005), online: HPRAC 
<http://www.hprac.org/downloads/sep05/ExecutiveSummary-Sept26.pdf>. 
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a broader continued competency and continuous improvement approach.24 Programs should 
be evaluated based on their ability to improve patient outcomes through the use of methods 
that can produce measurable changes in professional practice, and colleges should be 
accountable to the government and the public for the effectiveness of their programs.25
 
The number of hours worked by health professionals is an issue that has important 
implications for patient safety.  Research indicates that excessive working hours contribute to 
an increased risk of unsafe care. Other sectors, such as transportation, have regulated the 
number of hours worked in the sector to protect public safety. The regulation of working 
hours in the health sector is also a major issue in the United States.  Of course, the regulation 
of working hours in the health care sector has complex human resource planning and funding 
implications.  One might query the transferability across sectors here. However, it should be 
emphasized that legislation has been used in some states in the United States and the 
European Union to regulate working hours for health professionals, while collective 
agreements are used in New Zealand.  It was the strongly expressed view of some of the 
patient safety experts that we consulted for this project that some structured reduction of 
working hours for at least some health care professionals is required in Canada. The European 
Union and New Zealand, using different legal instruments, have had some success in 
achieving structured reductions in working hours. We recommend that these options be 
explored further and steps be taken to establish controls on working hours. 
 
c. What 
 
Regulation of drugs and devices plays a necessary and valuable role in ensuring that drugs 
and devices are safe for patients to use.26  It is an important mechanism to set standards for 
drugs and devices and their design, manufacture, trials and use, and to monitor and react to 
signals that the risks associated with a particular drug or device are too high and the drug or 
device should be withdrawn from the market.  However, the Auditor General of Canada has 
identified numerous weaknesses in the regulation of devices27 and, with respect to drugs, 
                                                 
24 See Health Professions Regulatory Advisory Council, Report to the Minister of Health and Long-term Care: 
Effectiveness of Colleges’ Quality Assurance Programs (Toronto:  HPRAC, 2000) at 7,8, 17, online:  HPRAC 
<http://www.hprac.org/downloads//qualityassurance/QaHPRAC.pdf>, where in a review of the effectiveness of 
College Quality Assurance programs, Ontario’s HPRAC concluded that practice assessment activities were the 
most rigorous and objective method to evaluate practitioner performance and the translation of continuing 
education lessons into practice. It noted that some colleges experienced significant member resistance to practice 
assessments due to its invasiveness and that some colleges viewed practice assessments as punishment for 
substandard practice. It recommended that the Minister develop detailed guidelines regarding practice 
assessments.  
25 Under Ontario’s Regulated Health Professions Act, supra note 22 at ss. 6(2)(a), 11(1)(d), HPRAC has a 
general duty to advise the Minister on matters concerning QA programs and was required to report on their 
effectiveness five years after the provision came into force. HPRAC recommended in its report that one of its 
statutory duties should be the ongoing monitoring and evaluation of QA programs. Alberta’s Act requires each 
college to submit an annual report, including information about the College’s continuing competency program, 
to the Minister, which must then be presented to Legislative Assembly. See also ibid. at ii and Health 
Professions Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. H-7, s. 4. 
26 Food and Drugs Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-27; Medical Devices Regulations, S.O.R./1998-282; Food and Drug 
Regulations, C.R.C., c. 870. 
27 Auditor General of Canada, Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons (Ottawa:  
Office of the Auditor General of Canada, 2004) c. 2 at 4. 
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there is a burgeoning literature identifying and analyzing the deficiencies in the regulatory 
system.28  Concerns focus on inadequacies in the systems of oversight in advance of licensing 
and inadequate monitoring, analysis, and communication of adverse events post-licensing.  
Lack of transparency, conflicts of interest, and lack of resources and capacity in the system 
have all been identified as causes of these problems.  It must be noted that similar problems 
are being faced in many countries.  A number of possible solutions are being proposed and 
tried.  For example, the Danish Medicines Agency (an independent agency) is empowered 
under Danish law to implement and enforce the legislation relating to medical devices and 
medicinal products.  The Agency evaluates the quality of proposed clinical trials and, post-
approval, physicians as well as the pharmaceutical industry are required to report adverse 
drug reactions to the Agency which, together with the Council for Adverse Drug Reactions, 
monitors and evaluates the reports and communicates the results of the evaluations.29   
 
There is an immediate need for the federal and provincial governments to acknowledge the 
need for law reform and to commit to it.  Then, governments must explore the various 
possible ways to address the problems.  Drawing on the academic literature and the 
experiences in other countries, we can conclude that these include: mandatory participation in 
clinical trials registries; the creation of a truly independent research ethics oversight system; 
greater transparency in the drug approval process; and mandatory reporting, analysis, and 
communication of reports of adverse events related to drugs and devices. 
 
3. Part Two – Knowing About 
 
In this part of the matrix, law can be seen to work to inhibit or support the discovery and open 
discussion of unsafe acts in a health system. A number of fears keep health care providers 
from acknowledging unsafe acts, including damage to one’s reputation and exposure to 
professional discipline or litigation.  A number of legal instruments seek to address these 
concerns by creating protected environments for providers to use.  These instruments include 
qualified privilege legislation that grant evidentiary protections for peer review as well as 
quality assurance activities and statutory adverse event reporting systems with similar 
protections. On the other hand, disclosure and public accountability are also important 
interests and legal instruments are being used to increase disclosure to patients, the gathering 
of patient complaints, and the public availability of safety information in order to drive 
improvements to patient safety.  
 
                                                 
28 For a compilation of stories reporting concerns about the monitoring of adverse reactions to approved drugs 
refer to Health Coalition, online:  <http://www.healthcoalition.ca/drugs-media.pdf>; Janice Graham, “Smart 
Regulation: Will the Government’s Strategy Work?” (2005) 173 C.M.A.J. 1469; Joel Lexchin & Barbara 
Mintzes, “Transparency in Drug Regulation: Myth or Oasis?” (2004) 171 C.M.A.J. 1503; Science Advisory 
Board Committee on the Drug Review Process, Report to Health Canada (Ottawa: Science Advisory Board 
Committee on the Drug Review Process, 2000). 
29 See Danish Medicines Agency, online:  <http://www.dkma.dk/1024/visUKLSArtikel.asp?artikelID=7696>, 
where it is stated that on 6 December 2005, the Danish Parliament passed the Medicines Act (DK), 2005/1180, 
online (in Danish online):  www.retsinfo.dk.  The Act was affirmed by the Queen on 12 December 2005 and 
entered into force on 17 December 2005. 
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a. Discovery 
 
One important mechanism by which unsafe acts are acknowledged and discussed is through 
their disclosure by providers to patients, peers, the public, or other data gathering processes. 
In the case of patients, ethical obligations exist for providers to inform patients of unsafe care.  
These obligations may find expression in voluntary codes of conduct (sometimes referred to 
as “soft law”) developed by professional bodies.  Canadian common law cases exist that 
establish a positive legal duty for providers to disclose errors to patients.30 However, tort law 
and professional sanctions have been seen to be significant legal disincentives to disclosure. 
Possible legal responses to overcoming these disincentives to disclosure to patients used in 
other jurisdictions with tort-based systems include the passage of apology laws in some states 
in the United States and Australia, in which apologies do not constitute admissions of civil 
liability and also in some states do not constitute admissions of unsatisfactory professional 
performance for the purposes of professional regulation.31 A number of U.S. states and two 
provinces in Canada have also passed laws which require disclosure of unsafe acts but not 
admissions of liability.  In Manitoba, health care organizations will soon have a positive duty 
to ensure that a patient is fully informed about the facts of a critical incident,32 its 
consequences for the patient, and past and future actions for addressing the consequences.  In 
Quebec, users have the right to be informed by public institutions as soon as possible of any 
accident33 that has actual or potential consequences for their health and the measures to be 
taken to address any consequence they suffered, as well as steps to prevent such an accident 
from recurring.34  Law reform, such as in Quebec or Manitoba, that requires the disclosure of 
unsafe acts and the development of policies and processes that support both parties in having 
such a discussion should be considered. 
 
There are also a number of data gathering and analysis processes used around the world.  
These include quality assurance processes, mortality and morbidity review processes,35 and 
                                                 
30 Tracey M. Bailey and Nola M. Ries, “Legal Issues in Patient Safety:  The example of Nosocomial Infection” 
(2005) 8 Health Care Q. 142; Philip C. Hebert, Alex V. Levin & Gerald Robertson, “Bioethics for Clinicians: 23. 
Disclosure of Medical Error,” (2001) 146 C.M.A.J. 509. 
31 See e.g. Wrongs and Other Acts (Public Liability Insurance Reform) Act 2002, (Vic.), amending Wrongs Act 
1958, (Vic.). 
32 See The Regional Health Authorities Amendment and Manitoba Evidence Amendment Act, S.M. 2005, c. 24, 
ss. 53.1, 53.2(2) where a critical incident is defined as “an unintended event that occurs when health services are 
provided to an individual and results in a consequence to him or her that (a) is serious and undesired, such as 
death, disability, injury or harm, unplanned admission to hospital or unusual extension of a hospital stay, and 
(b) does not result from the individual's underlying health condition or from a risk inherent in providing the 
health services.”  This Act had not been proclaimed in force as of December 30, 2005.   
33 See An Act Respecting Health Services and Social Services, R.S.Q. c. S-4.2, s. 8 [Health Services and Social 
Services Act], where an accident is defined as “an action or situation where a risk event occurs which has or 
could have consequences for the state of health or welfare of the user, a personnel member, a professional 
involved or a third person.”  Respect for user rights under the legislation is monitored via Quebec’s statutory 
patient complaints scheme. 
34 Ibid.  The wording of this right in Quebec’s legislation places a clearer emphasis on learning and future 
prevention than Manitoba’s legislated duty.  
35 In New Zealand, there are statutory national mortality review committees for child, youth, perinatal and 
maternal deaths.  In the state of Victoria, Australia, the Government has established a number of statutory 
consultative councils which analyze mortality and morbidity data in the areas of surgery, anaesthesia, obstetrics 
and paediatrics.  England has a system of confidential inquiries for Maternal and Child Health; Patient Outcome 
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adverse event reporting systems.  A relatively new innovation in health systems, adverse 
event reporting systems are a feature of safety regulation in other sectors and have contributed 
to measurable improvements in safety in those sectors.36  Reporting systems can potentially 
detect trends or patterns in adverse events that point to system failures and enable corrective 
strategies to be developed and implemented to prevent future events, as well as provide 
greater information to stakeholders on the overall performance of the system.  Legal 
instruments have been used in a number of the jurisdictions studied to establish adverse event 
reporting systems for their health systems.  These reporting systems can operate at the 
national, provincial/state or institutional level.  
 
In Canada, to maximize effectiveness, such a reporting system could involve all provinces and 
territories establishing harmonized statutory reporting systems that can collect standardized 
data which is then integrated into a national database, so that data can be pooled, patient 
safety trends identified, and lessons learned shared across jurisdictions. The alternative is 
thirteen siloed provincial and territorial reporting systems, where information is not shared 
and events have a greater chance of appearing to be isolated one-off occurrences. To date, 
three provinces currently have legal frameworks establishing provincial adverse event 
reporting systems, although only one province’s legislation is fully in force. For input in 
designing a statutory adverse event reporting system to improve patient safety, we 
recommend further study of Denmark. Its mandatory learning system is non-punitive, 
confidential, and allows for anonymous reporting. Near-miss37 data is collected as well as 
adverse events and information is used locally, in addition to being recorded in a de-identified 
form in a national register. A national body tracks events and reports on identified safety 
risks. 
 
Another means of discovering unsafe acts is through patient complaint mechanisms, as both 
patients and providers are sources of knowledge in terms of the safety and quality of health 
care delivery. Complaints can be a valuable patient safety learning tool when handled 
appropriately. In order to enhance learning from patient experiences, accessible mechanisms 
need to be in place, members of the public need to be aware of them, and patients and 
providers must be encouraged and supported in bringing forward safety and quality concerns. 
 
In Canada, patient complaints are either not gathered or their collection is not coordinated 
across the continuum of care. Concerns exist among experts about the independence of the 
statutory complaints mechanisms administered by professional colleges and the largely 
voluntary internal complaints mechanisms maintained in a variety of health institutions and 
regions, which may be perceived by the public as being weighted towards provider interests 
rather than the public interest.38  A number of the jurisdictions studied, including the United 
                                                                                                                                                        
and Death; and Suicide and Homicide by People Using Mental Health Services.  These reviews have a 
preventative purpose and can lead to strategies or standards to improve practice.
36 See e.g. the discussion in Paul Barach & Stephan Small, “Reporting and Preventing Medical Mishaps: Lessons 
from Non-Medical Near Miss Reporting Systems” (2000) 320 B.M.J. 759. 
37 A near-miss is an event that could have resulted in harm but did not, either by chance or intervention.  
38 See IBM Business Consulting Services, Health Insider: Survey No. 8, Fall/Winter 2002 (Toronto:  IBM 
Consulting Services, 2002), as cited in C. Flood and T. Epps, “Waiting for Health Care: What Role for a 
Patients’ Bill of Rights?” (2004) 49 McGill L.J. 515 at 519., where it is reported that in a national survey 
conducted in 2002, nine out of ten Canadians indicated their support for an independent commissioner or 
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Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia (Commonwealth aged care regulation)39 use legal 
instruments to require internal complaints systems in places of care to enhance local learning 
and action, coupled with an external independent complaints system.  In Canada, the same is 
done most extensively in Quebec.  These frameworks recognize the effectiveness of good 
internal complaints systems and an independent external body in increasing systems 
improvements and accountability. As part of the legal framework in the above jurisdictions, 
independent advocacy services are also available to provide patients with support in bringing 
forward concerns.   
 
The experience of the Canadian occupational health and safety sector illustrates the potential 
role of patient advocates and third party reinforcement in these complaint processes. In terms 
of worker safety, we encountered a view strongly held among experts that occupational health 
and safety law often works best where workers are strongly positioned to act as their own 
advocates, as when they are represented by a union. In comparison, patients are in a position 
of relative dependency in the health care system and are therefore not in a good position to 
insist on their rights and interests. This vulnerability is perhaps increased by the shifting of 
care to home and community settings.  We recommend looking further at both the Quebec 
and New Zealand models for input in designing a complaints system.   
 
Quebec’s legislative framework for complaints mechanisms enhances consistency at the local 
level in that it requires a complaints procedure with mandatory elements to be in place in all 
public institutions and regional agencies.40 Compliance is monitored by an independent body, 
the Health Services Ombudsman. Local or regional quality commissioners, whose 
independence is protected by boards of directors, are responsible for investigating complaints 
and enforcing user rights, including the right to receive health services “with continuity and in 
a personalized and safe manner.”41   Complainants who disagree with the conclusions reached 
at the local level or the response taken to local recommendations can apply to the Health 
Services Ombudsman for further examination. Institutions and regional authorities are 
required to respond to the Ombudsman’s recommendations in writing. Evidentiary protections 
are included in the legislation to enhance provider co-operation and retaliation against 
complainants is prohibited. Learning is shared throughout the system in that local institutions 
send reports containing complaint summaries and significant recommendations to regional 
agencies, who then submit an annual report to the Minister, which is tabled in the National 
Assembly. The Ombudsman reports a high voluntary uptake of recommendations. 
Weaknesses of the Quebec system include that it is limited to public institutions and the 
Ombudsman is accountable to the Minister, rather than the National Assembly.   
 
                                                                                                                                                        
ombudsperson with the power to hear complaints about health care providers and services and make 
recommendations.  
39 In addition, all Australian states/territories are required to have in place independent complaints bodies to 
resolve complaints involving the provision of public hospital services as part of Australian Health Care 
Agreements between the Commonwealth and state or territorial governments. These agreements also set out 
Commonwealth funding levels. 
40 An Act respecting the Health and Social Services Ombudsman, R.S.Q. c.P-31.1 [Health and Social Services 
Ombudsman]; Health Services and Social Services Act, supra note 33  
41 This right is not freestanding and is limited by “the human, material, and financial resources” of institutions 
(Health Services and Social Services Act, ibid.). 
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In New Zealand’s legal framework, the Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers’ 
Rights 1996 sets out ten “consumer rights” which providers must comply with.  The Code 
includes a right to services of an appropriate standard, which includes “the right to have 
services provided in a manner that minimises the potential harm to, and optimises the quality 
of life of, that consumer” and “the right to co-operation among providers to ensure quality and 
continuity of services.”42  The Code also contains a right to complain and requires that 
providers have a complaints procedure in place that meets specified requirements.43 An 
independent third party, the Health and Disability Commissioner (HDC), can receive 
complaints concerning breaches of the Code by any individual or organization that provides 
health or disability services, making the system broader in scope than that of Quebec.  The 
Commissioner can investigate all parties to an event and can address both individual and 
systems issues affecting the quality of care.44 The Commissioner sends important findings to 
key agencies and professional bodies and there is evidence that providers are increasingly 
using reports to educate themselves and to implement changes.45 Recent legislative changes 
to the scheme designed to improve the complaints process in New Zealand make the HDC the 
initial “one window” recipient of complaints concerning health services providers and give 
the Commissioner more flexible options for resolving complaints.46   
 
b. Inquiry 
 
Many of the traditional legal inquiry mechanisms developed when the focus was primarily on 
individual responsibility and few are currently equipped to address systems issues. Inquiry 
processes also tend to be siloed provincially and recommendations are not readily shared 
across provincial boundaries. An example is the recommendations of the Sinclair report, 
which only saw substantial uptake in Manitoba, despite broad distribution.47 More needs to be 
done to collate and share lessons learned from these processes nationally.  
                                                 
42 Health and Disability Commissioner Regulations (Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers’ Rights) 
Regulations 1996 (N.Z.), 1996/78, as am. by 2004/116.  It should be noted that these rights are not absolute. If a 
provider can show they have taken reasonable steps to give effect to the rights given all the relevant 
circumstances, including the clinical circumstances of the consumer and the resource constraints of the provider, 
the provider will not have breached the Code. 
43 Ibid. at ss. 10(6)-(7). Also, additional complaints management requirements, such as linking the complaints 
process to quality and risk management systems in order to enhance learning, are included in the Health and 
Disability Sector Standards NZS 8134:2001 for providers who require certification.  
44 The Commissioner’s findings are publicly available, usually in the form of an anonymised report.  See See 
The Health and Disability Commissioner, Case 03HDC10460 and Case 03HDC03134, online:  HDC 
<http://www.hdc.org.nz/casenotes.php?year=2003>, for examples of the Commissioner’s reports that address 
quality of care issues at both levels. 
45 The Health and Disability Commissioner, “A Review of the Health and Disability Commissioner Act 1994 and 
the Code of Health Disability Services Consumers’ Rights: A Resource for Public Consultation” (2004), online:  
HDC < http://www.hdc.org.nz/theact.php?content=19> at 11.  This evidence is anecdotal in nature 
(correspondence from Nicola Sladden, HDC Legal Manager (August 2005)). 
46 Previously, the Commissioner had to investigate all complaints unless he or she referred it to an advocate or 
decided to take no action. Under the new Act, the Commissioner conducts preliminary assessments and can 
choose from low level resolution mechanisms such as mediation in addition to investigation. It should be noted 
that if the Commissioner decides to conduct an investigation, at its conclusion, he or she can choose to refer the 
case to the Director of Proceedings, a statutorily independent prosecutor who decides whether to take the case to 
the independent  Health Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal or before the Human Rights Review Tribunal. 
47 Jan Davies, “Painful Inquiry:  Lessons from Winnipeg” (2001) 165 C.M.A.J. 1503. 
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In Australia, coronial inquest results are shared via a national information system. The first of 
its kind in the world, the National Coroners Information System (NCIS), is a database that 
contains information such as the medical cause of death and the circumstances surrounding a 
death from all Australian coroners cases since 2000. Information from the system has been 
used in the context of patient safety in areas such as deaths associated with pregnancy, the 
insertion of naso-gastric tubes, and the administration of medication in nursing homes.48 In 
Canada, variability in the statutory criteria for coronial review, variability in the scope, extent, 
and quality of individual investigations, variability in the extent of examination and the 
quality of the evidence produced, and variations in the types of deaths investigated would 
cause difficulty in establishing such a database. We recommend further study be undertaken 
to explore the utility of harmonizing Canadian fatality legislation as a means of improving 
patient safety.  
 
Across the jurisdictions we studied, we observed changes in law that reflected a number of 
concerns with the legislative framework for professional regulatory inquiries.  These concerns 
included: a lack of standardization; a lack of a systems perspective; a lack of alternative 
processes that minimize the punitive nature of the process while still addressing patient safety 
concerns; and a lack of public trust and transparency.  New Zealand’s independent HDC is 
one possible model in that the Commissioner is able to look at the multiple professionals and 
institutions involved in an incident and to look at both individual actors and systems factors. 
The HDC is also able to use low level resolution mechanisms, such as mediation, to resolve 
concerns. Alternate dispute resolution is also a statutory mechanism available to colleges in 
Alberta.49  In Canada, consideration should be given to wider standardization of professional 
regulatory processes through the use of umbrella legislation to create greater consistency for 
the public. In addition, the move towards interdisciplinary practice exposes a weakness in 
current disciplinary systems in that these systems are not equipped to address broad systemic 
issues nor the complexities of multidisciplinary practice.  Currently, multiple professions and 
bodies may potentially investigate a single incident.  This creates inefficiencies, both fiscal 
and in terms of effectiveness of investigation of the incident.  A single collaborative review 
mechanism capable of identifying individual and/or system factors at work may be useful.50   
                                                 
48 Victorian Institute of Forensic Medicine, “The National Coroners Information System” (November 2004) 2:4 
Coronial Communiqué 2, online:  VIFM <http://www.vifm.org/attachments/o352.pdf>.  See also Australian 
Council for Safety and Quality in Health Care, “Safety in Numbers”, Attachment to Safety in Practice-Making 
Health Care Safer, Second Report to the Australian Health Ministers Conference, (1 August 2001) at 17. 
49 Under Alberta’s HPA, a college’s complaints director may refer the complainant and the member, with their 
consent, to an alternative complaint resolution process any time before a hearing is held.  The college will be 
required to participate in the process and any proposed settlements are subject to ratification by a complaint 
review committee. 
50 National Steering Committee, National Steering Committee on Patient Safety, Building a Safer System: A 
National Integrated Strategy for Improving Patient Safety in Canadian Health Care (2002), online: RCPSC 
<http://rcpsc.medical.org/publications/building_a_safer_system_e.pdf> at 15.  In Health Professions Regulatory 
Advisory Council, Adjusting the Balance: A Review of the Regulated Health Professions Act - A Report to the 
Minister of Health and Long-Term Care (Toronto: Health Professions Regulatory Advisory Council 2001) at 15, 
online: HPRAC  <http://www.hprac.org/downloads//fyr/RHPAReport.pdf>, Ontario’s Health Professions 
Regulatory Advisory Council (HPRAC) indicates that some support was expressed for empowering colleges to 
identify and report practice setting or systemic issues.  HPRAC did not recommend using RHPA as a mechanism 
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The decline in public confidence concerning the inquiry processes administered by 
professional colleges, in that they are perceived to be weighted towards protecting members 
of the profession rather than the public, seems to explain a good deal of the legislative and 
regulatory change we observed in the jurisdictions that we studied.  Possible solutions include 
meta-regulation or regulating the self-regulatory professions, as is the case in the United 
Kingdom. The U.K.’s Council for the Regulation of Health Professionals is an agency that 
monitors the performance of each regulatory body and may refer to court the decision of a 
regulatory body in relation to professional discipline that it considers unduly lenient or which 
in its view should not have been made.51  Other jurisdictions, such as New Zealand and 
Victoria, Australia, have removed one or more of these processes to an independent body. In 
Victoria, serious disciplinary matters are now heard by an administrative tribunal, while in 
New Zealand, investigatory and disciplinary functions have been transferred from 
professional registration bodies to the HDC and a separate disciplinary body.  While we are 
not in a position to say if a comparable decline in public confidence has occurred in Canada or 
to the validity of it if it has occurred, we can say that these examples demonstrate that other 
countries have moved to increase the accountability and independence of disciplinary 
processes and to create frameworks that promise more consistency in how complaints are 
addressed across professions.  They have also moved to facilitate the ability of patients to 
make what amount to “system complaints” instead of a series of complaints to different 
regulatory bodies.  These trends appear responsive to many of the concerns about the 
traditionally structured system of professional self-regulation that have often been raised and 
that seem inherent in a system of decentralized self-regulation that must operate within a 
system of health care in which the delivery of care is increasingly integrated.  It therefore 
seems that there is good reason to carefully consider the relevance of these patterns of change 
in other jurisdictions to Canada. 
 
4. Part Three – Responding 
 
When an unsafe act occurs in the health care system, the traditional legal response has 
focused on assigning fault to the actions of individual providers and compensating victims. 
This focus can create a tendency towards blaming and penalizing individuals, which in turn 
can inhibit disclosure and learning from unsafe acts. In the sectors and jurisdictions studied, 
there has been a general shift to a systems perspective in legal frameworks, so that when an 
unsafe act occurs, the response involves identifying system deficiencies that contributed to the 
unsafe act and creating improved practices and processes in the system in order to prevent 
future occurrences. Individual accountability remains important, but there is an increased 
focus on learning and prevention through systems improvements.  In Denmark, for example, a 
statutory mandatory adverse event monitoring system was created to focus exclusively on 
shared learning from unsafe acts and near miss-incidents and its success is measured in part 
on its ability to create changes in practice in hospital wards.52 Denmark’s compensation 
                                                                                                                                                        
for addressing broader quality of care issues in the health system, but rather setting up a taskforce on system 
errors.    
51 National Health Service Reform and Health Care Professions Act 2002 (U.K.), 2002, c. 17, s. 29. 
52 Act on Patient Safety in the Danish Health Care System, No. 429 of 10 June 2003.  Reporters to the learning 
system, as it is called in Denmark, cannot be subject to criminal sanctions by courts or disciplinary investigations 
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scheme does not require that fault be proven.  Individual accountability is maintained through 
a separate disciplinary process.  In order to improve patient safety, the Canadian legal 
framework needs to work towards generating outcomes that reflect a systems perspective to 
unsafe acts and their causes, while maintaining individual accountability where appropriate.    
 
At a systemic level, outcomes from different processes are not being shared at the provincial 
or national level and their cumulative effects are not felt across the system. Effective feedback 
mechanisms are needed and lessons learned must not only be shared across the system, but 
translated into action.  Law can be used to facilitate these goals. In Quebec, the legal 
framework for the patient complaints scheme requires that lessons learned move from the 
local level through the regional level to the provincial level via reporting to the Minister. This 
allows information to reach those who can make changes to the system. By requiring 
institutions or regional agencies to send a written report to the Health Services Ombudsman 
and to the complainant detailing what actions have been taken in response to the 
recommendations or the reasons why no actions have been taken, the legal framework 
increases accountability and may contribute to greater action.53   Information about the safety 
performance of the system also needs to reach the public for accountability and transparency 
purposes. For example, in Pennsylvania, the state’s Patient Safety Authority is required by 
law to make available on its website an annual report that contains the number of reported 
serious events and incidents on a geographical or regional level, as well as recognized patient 
safety trends identified from the data. 
  
When a patient receives unsafe care, legal attention must be paid to both accountability and 
restoration.  That is, to holding those who are responsible for the act and the harm accountable 
and to restoring the person who has been harmed.  This is a difficult and complex task.  For 
example, sometimes the choice of legal instrument results in high accountability returns with 
low restoration (e.g., a criminal or professional disciplinary case) or vice versa (e.g., a settled 
civil action).  Sometimes the choice of legal instrument results in some individuals being held 
accountable but fails to attach accountability to institutions or systems (e.g, a lawsuit against a 
physician).  Sometimes the choice of legal instrument makes possible some kinds of 
restoration (e.g., financial) but not others (e.g., emotional). 
 
For example, in some jurisdictions studied, the effectiveness and/or efficiency of tort law as a 
means of achieving restoration or accountability, as well as the broader goal of systems 
improvement is being questioned.54 Although a strength of the traditional tort-based system 
                                                                                                                                                        
or measures by employers or the health professions regulatory body (National Board of Health) based on their 
reports. Except for county councils who are responsible for analyzing reports and using them to improve patient 
safety, identifiable information is not shared with any other body. These elements were seen as critical to 
obtaining the support of health professionals.   
53Health and Social Services Ombudsman, supra note 40 at s. 15. 
54 Two significant claims made for the fault-based model are that it is an effective deterrence mechanism for the 
health provider being sued and other health providers and is an important educative tool.  The evidence to 
support these claims is decidedly mixed.  See P.H. Osbourne, “Compensation for Medical Injuries:  An 
Uncertain Future” in Barney Sneiderman, John C. Irvine & Philip H. Osborne, eds., Canadian Medical Law, 3rd 
ed. (Toronto:  Carswell, 2003); M. Mello & T. Brennan, “Deterrence of Medical Errors: Theory and Evidence 
for Malpractice Reform” (2002) 80 Texas L. Rev. 1595; L. Dubay, R. Kaestner & T. Waidman, “The Impact of 
Malpractice Fears on Caesarian Section Rates” (1999) 18 J. Health Econ. 491; A. Localio et al., “Relationships 
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is that it may fully compensate patients for loss when fault is proven, a related weakness of 
the system is the difficulty and expense of proving fault, with the result that many legitimate 
claimants are not compensated at all.  Further equity issues are raised by the numbers of 
potential plaintiffs who do not make a claim and those who are not aware that they could 
make a claim because it was not disclosed to them that the treatment or care provided was 
possibly negligent.  Arguably as significant is the inequitable treatment of those who suffered 
an adverse event that was not due to negligence but who have no avenues to seek redress. In 
terms of emotional restoration, tort law forces both patient and provider into adversarial 
positions that can be emotionally damaging.  
 
Possible solutions include moving to a non-negligence-based system of compensation, as is 
the case in Denmark and New Zealand. In terms of compensation, it is suggested by some 
that these systems are more efficient in that the model generally involves one agency with 
defined procedures and thus there are significant efficiency savings, even though the 
numbers of persons receiving coverage substantially increase.  This results in costs that are 
similar to or less than the current tort system.55  Others argue the opposite.56   A broader 
compensation system can allow for more supportive and open relationships between health 
professionals and patients after an unsafe act occurs in that the professional assists the patient 
in receiving compensation.  In Quebec, a public institution’s quality and risk management 
committee is required by law to ensure victims and their families are provided support 
services after an accident or an incident.57 Restorative justice models for addressing unsafe 
acts in health systems have potential for achieving better outcomes for individuals and 
systems, in that they can restore relationships and may lead to plans of action for future 
systems improvements. Restorative justice models may be one means of maximizing 
accountability and restoration and for situating accountability at the level of the individual 
but also institutional and systemic and for providing financial, emotional, and/or relational 
restoration.  Further research should be conducted to explore restorative justice’s potential 
benefits.58
 
In order to improve patient safety, Canadian patient safety legal frameworks need to work 
towards developing sophisticated accountability mechanisms and restorative mechanisms for 
dealing with unsafe acts in the health care system.  Denmark’s patient safety legal framework 
is worthy of further study in this regard. Under Denmark’s legal framework, the country’s 
compensation scheme is separate from its patient complaints and disciplinary process. 
Providers and patients can participate in a restorative process through their compensation 
scheme, which allows them to work as partners rather than adversaries and also facilitates 
                                                                                                                                                        
between Malpractice Claims and Caesarian Delivery” (1993) 269 J.A.M.A. 366; D. Kessler & M. McClellan, 
“Do Doctors Practice Defensive Medicine?” (1996) 111 Q. J. Econ. 353. 
55 See e.g. David Studdert & Troyen Brennan, “No-Fault Compensation for Medical Injuries: The Prospect of 
Error Prevention” (2001) 286 J.A.M.A 217. 
56 See e.g. Canadian Medical Protective Association, Medical Liability Practices in Canada: Towards the Right 
Balance (Ottawa:  CMPA, 2005).  The company commissioned by the CMPA to undertake this analysis suggests 
that in Canada the adoption of a no-fault plan would see costs rise from $225 million to approximately $40 
billion.  Even the application of "filters" requiring injuries to be "unintended and avoidable" could see annual 
system costs rise to $2.6 billion. 
57 Health Services and Social Services Act, supra note 33 at s. 183.2. 
58 Braithwaite, supra note 4 at 29-31. 
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open dialogue. This partnership may make it less likely that patients will seek to access the 
more punitive accountability mechanism of professional discipline, although this 
accountability option remains open to them. No identifiable information from the 
compensation process is shared with the complaints body.  Denmark’s statutory mandatory 
adverse event reporting system is for the purposes of shared learning and patient safety 
improvement, and while providers are required to report, they are permitted to do so 
anonymously and further, disciplinary or criminal sanctions are not permitted as a result of 
information reported.  Thus, there is a clear demarcation between on the one hand 
information gathered for purposes of complaints, investigations, and compensation, and 
information gathered under the national adverse event monitoring system.  This element is 
seen as critical to gaining the initial and ongoing support of the health care professionals 
themselves, and does not appear to have resulted in discontent within the Danish public. 
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III. GLOSSARY 
 
Accountability 
A principle that individuals, organizations, and government are to be held responsible for their 
actions and omissions.     
 
Data-gathering and analysis 
The act or process of gathering information and analyzing it to identify trends or patterns.  In 
the context of patient safety, these processes include but are not limited to: quality assurance, 
adverse event reporting, and confidential inquiries. 
 
Disclosure 
The act or process of revealing information to a patient, the patient’s family, peers, the public, 
and to data-gathering or inquiry processes. 
 
Effectiveness  
Success in achieving a given goal. 
 
Efficiency  
The production of the desired effects or results with minimum waste of time, effort, money, or 
skill.   
 
Equity  
Dealing fairly, equally and justly with all. 
 
Governance  
“The sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their 
common affairs.”59  
 
Health Services  
Personal health care services (e.g., mental health services, drugs and devices, primary care 
services, long-term care facilities, and acute hospital care) and public health care services 
(e.g., the provision of blood products, and measures relating to communicable and infectious 
diseases). 
 
Health Systems  
All of the organizations, institutions, and resources that culminate in the delivery of health 
services.60   
 
                                                 
59 Kernaghan Webb, “Sustainable Governance in the 21st Century:  Moving Beyond Instrument Choice” in Pearl 
Eliadas, Margaret Hill & Michael Howlett, Designing Government: From Instruments to Governance (Montreal: 
McGill-Queens University Press, 2005). 
60 Marie Lassey, William Lassey & Martin Jinks, Health Care Systems Around the World: Characteristics, 
Issues and Reforms, (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1997). 
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Law  
A process of social order – more specifically it is the top down projection of state authority 
expressed through the use of instruments and institutions (i.e., statutes, regulations, central 
agencies, administrative boards, regulatory tribunals).61   
 
Legal Instruments  
Legislation and statutory instruments, contracts, and torts. 
 
Patient Safety  
“The reduction and mitigation of unsafe acts within the health care system.”62  ‘Unsafe acts’ 
include “error, violation and sabotage.”63  “Error should be defined as the failure to complete 
a planned action as it was intended, or when an incorrect plan is used in an attempt to achieve 
a given aim.  Violation should be defined as representing a deliberate deviation from 
standards, rules or safe operating procedures.  Sabotage should be defined as an activity in 
which both the acts and the harm or damage are intended.”64  Unsafe acts, if unchecked, may 
result in physical, emotional, psychological and/or spiritual harm.  
 
Quality  
A degree of excellence that encompasses measures to ensure patient safety, practice that is 
consistent with socially defined values and norms, practice that is consistent with current 
medical knowledge, and customization (the ability to meet customer specific values and 
expectations). 
 
Restoration 
As much as it is possible, to return a person, or people, to their former position.  This may 
include truth-telling, apology, reconciliation, and provision of compensation.   
 
Transparency  
The free, public, and timely availability of reliable and relevant information. 
 
 
 
                                                 
61 This theory, that law is a product of the political state and its institutions, is grounded in the theory of legal 
positivism.  Only the state and its agents create law and its paradigmatic form is legislation.  Law is seen as a top 
down projection of state authority and there is a clear distinction between what is and is not law.  A broader view 
suggests that non-state normative orders are part of the legal system and the enterprise of law is a joint project of 
the law subject and the law maker.  So, law or regulation can be understood to include tacit and implicit 
processes of social ordering such as custom, practice, and culture.  We acknowledge the truth of the latter – that 
custom, practice and culture developed by actors at all levels in the health system (including government) plays a 
significant role in shaping and establishing social order in the health system.  However, for the purposes of this 
project we focus on the former.  See discussion in Roderick MacDonald, “The Swiss Army Knife of 
Governance” in Pearl Eliadas, Margaret Hill & Michael Howlett, Designing Government: From Instruments to 
Governance, (Montreal:  McGill-Queens University Press, 2005).    
62 J. Davies et al., Canadian Patient Safety Dictionary (Ottawa:  College of Physicians and Surgeons of Canada, 
2003). 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. at 57. 
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